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by Guido Schryen
Spam has become one of the most annoying and costly phenomenon on the Internet. Valid e-mail addresses are among the most valuable resources of spammers, 
but little is known about the methods by which spammers 
collect and harvest addresses. Spammers’ capabilities and 
interest in carefully directed, consumer-oriented marketing 
have not yet been explored. Gaining insight into spammers’ 
ways of obtaining and misusing e-mail addresses is useful 
in many ways; e.g., for assessing the effectiveness of tech-
niques that obscure addresses and the usefulness and neces-
sity of hiding e-mail addresses on the Internet. This paper 
presents a spam honeypot project in progress that addresses 
these issues by systematically placing e-mail addresses on 
the Internet and analyzing received e-mails. 
The Threat
Spam is generally recognized as an increasingly dis-
turbing and costly issue for electronic business and 
Internet traffic. Companies, non-profit organizations, and 
individuals receive this type of e-mail to such an extent 
that the issue has certainly gone beyond that which 
is merely “annoying.” Symantec reports that, in scan-
ning 100 billion e-mails, the percentage of spam e-mails 
reached 69% in January 2005 but decreased to 60% in 
May. [1] MessageLabs announced that the average global 
ratio of spam was nearly 70% in May 2005, although the 
sample of e-mails inspected was much smaller, comprising 
some one million per day. [2] The content of spammers’ e-
mails covers a broad range of topics:
■ Offering or advertising general goods and services, 
such as devices, investigative services, clothing, and 
makeup (21% of all e-mails categorized as spam)
■ Containing references or offerings related to 
money, the stock market, or other financial 
“opportunities” (19%)
■ Containing or refering to products or services 
intended for persons above the age of 18 (10%)
■ Offering or advertising health-related products and 
services (13%) [1]
The increased payload of networks and e-mail servers and 
the demand on employees’ time and attention are not the 
only harmful effects of spam e-mails. Fraudulent messages; 
e.g., e-mails that appear to be from a well-known company 
but are not—also known as “brand spoofing” or “phishing” 
e-mails—are often used to trick users into revealing personal 
information, such as e-mail addresses, financial informa-
tion, and passwords (7%). Furthermore, viruses, worms, 
and Trojan horses (opening backdoors for botnets using the 
infected computer as a spam client) are distributed over the 
Internet. The total economic damage caused by spam e-mails 
is estimated at several billion dollars. [3] 
This central economic aspect has motivated anti-spam 
activities embracing many facets: national laws and inter-
national regulations (about which Hintz [4] provides a 
good overview); organizational provisions, including abuse 
systems (e.g., http://spam.abuse.net/) and lists of suspi-
cious domains and IP numbers; and technical solutions 
that mainly apply blocking, filtering, or authenticating 
mechanisms. [5] Statistics and e-mail users’ daily experi-
ence show that the spam problem is far from being solved, 
and it is only by applying technical anti-spam that the 
collapse of our Internet e-mail system has been prevented.
Implementing honeypots and honeynets has emerged 
as a solution [6, 7], along with these mainstream efforts 
to analyze spammers’ behaviour or to even attack them. 
The honeypot presented here contributes to this field by 
setting up a technical environment that analyzes where 
spammers get their e-mail addresses and how they exploit 
them—or if they simply use any harvested e-mail address. 
(A more detailed presentation of the honeypot project can 
be found in Schryen, [8]).
Motivation and Goals
Valid e-mail addresses are among the most valuable 
resources of spammers, and identifying address sources 
and the procedures used by spammers to exploit them is 
crucial to preventing spammers from getting addresses 
and misusing them. It is widely known that, besides gen-
erating addresses with brute-force mechanisms, spammers 
get valid e-mail addresses by harvesting the Internet or, 
illegally, from organizations. Some Address Obscuring 
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Techniques (AOTs) that restrict the availability and usabil-
ity of e-mail addresses have been proposed: As early as 
1997, Hall [9] described e-mail channels, and in 2003, 
Ioannidis [10] presented a policy for encapsulating single-
purpose addresses. Many users also use temporary address-
es and dispose of them when they feel that the spam quo-
tient has become too high.
Gaining insight into spammers’ ways of obtaining and 
misusing e-mail addresses is useful in many ways: 
■ Assessing the effectiveness of AOTs and input for 
their improvement
■ Identifiying spammers to lead to their prosecution
■ Assessing the usefulness and necessity of hiding 
e-mail addresses on the Internet
■ Discovering specific marketing and addressing 
activities
The last item, above, focuses on the quality of e-mail 
addresses. Spammers are known to collect as many valid 
e-mail addresses as possible, but little is known about 
spammers’ capabilities and interest in carefully directed, 
consumer-oriented marketing. A taxonomy of quality for 
e-mail addresses is shown in Figure 1.
The inner ellipses are more valuable for spammers 
than the outer ones because of losses caused by non-selec-
tive advertising. Only a portion of collected or generated 
e-mail addresses are valid ones, i.e., e-mails addressed to 
non-valid ones are refused by the addressee’s host because 
these mailboxes do not exist. Valid ones can be divided 
into addresses actually in use and those that are no longer 
accessed and thus useless for spammers. A way to distin-
guish between the two is provided by an “opt-out” option 
included in some spam e-mails; however, when this option 
is used incautiously by the spam recipient, it indicates that 
the address is in use. Spammers will go even further and 
adopt physical marketing strategies using knowledge about 
consumer-specific interests and behaviour; e.g., an Internet 
user actively participating in a German discussion group 
that focuses on medical products is presumably interested 
in offers of medical products in the German language. The 
innermost ellipse contains e-mail addresses of users who 
buy products and thus from whom the spammer profits.
The goal of the honeypot is to (1) penetrate spammers’ 
behavior in harvesting e-mail addresses from Internet ser-
vices, such as newsgroups and the Web, and (2) to discover 
the extent to which spammers have already shifted from 
simply employing e-mail addresses in use towards acquiring 
addresses of users likely to be interested in specific marketing.
Conceptual Framework
To cover a broad range of locations that are attrac-
tive to spammers for harvesting e-mail addresses, it is 
necessary to inspect many Internet services. Integrated 
into this honeypot are newsletters and mailing lists, Web 
pages, Web chats, chats, and the Usenet in which e-mail 
addresses are placed. There are many more ways in which 
spammers can get e-mail addresses [11] that have not 
yet been covered. This is simply caused by the limited 
resources of the project, which is currently not funded.
To detect linguistic and regional particularities, 
each medium is divided into those that are oriented 
to the German language and those that are US based. 
This furnishes a second, desirable dimension in that it 
renders the study readily extensible to other languages 
Figure 1: Taxonomy of E-mail Addresses
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and regions. To inspect spammers’ behavior regarding 
specific marketing activities, a third dimension of the 
survey focuses on the topic of the Internet service. For 
example, Web pages and newsletters and mailing lists are 
divided into those ruled by an individual, a discussion 
board, a greeting-card service, etc., in which the topics 
are grouped by types of administration, content, con-
nection, context, and commerce. (For a complete list of 
topics, see Schryen, [8]) It should be noted that topics 
are service specific. Figure 2 shows the classification of 
Internet locations as used in the empirical study. Each 
type of location is represented by a cube, each cube con-
tains three locations (a location is a specific Web site or 
a specific newsletter), each location gets four addresses 
(de-, com-, net-, and org-address), and for each cube 12 
e-mail addresses must be reserved. This procedure makes 
it possible to detect if the top-level domain of an e-mail 
address is relevant. So far, German and US newsletters 
and mailing lists and Web pages have been addressed, i.e.
the number of e-mail addresses placed for getting har-
vested is almost 2*2*36*12, which is 1728. Of course, no 
e-mail address must be seeded more than once.
Implementation
A mail server has been set up, charlie.winfor.rwth-
aachen.de, and three domains have been reserved, wfo-
rasp.com, wforasp.net, and wforasp.org, to cover the e-mail 
addresses of four top-level domains. All e-mails addressed 
to these domains are directed to this mail server. As thou-
sands of e-mail addresses had to be created, they were 
automatically generated by a random generator for the 
user part of the addresses. To prevent e-mail addresses 
from being guessed or generated with brute-force attacks, 
it is necessary to define them randomly and to give them 
an appropriate number of characters. An example of an e-
mail addresss created this way is wasp10208@wforasp.com. 
The Internet locations serving as lures were chosen manu-
ally, just as the placement of the e-mail addresses had to 
be done manually. As soon as an e-mail address is spread, 
its location and activation date is stored.
All incoming e-mails are classified into regular e-mails 
(ham e-mails), such as regular newsletters or the like that 
contain comments from users of discussion forums, and 
spam e-mails. This procedure is currently mainly executed 
by humans but supported by a mail parser written in 
Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP), which uses an increasing 
white list containing pairs of recipient-addresses, Internet 
Protocol (IP) entries: each time a host was manually 
assessed as qualified to send an e-mail to the recipient 
address, its IP number was linked to this e-mail address and 
stored in the white list. A second task of the mail parser 
is to decompose each incoming e-mail—all entries of the 
header and the content are analyzed, as is the Multipurpose 
Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) structure of the body. (A 
detailed description of the relational data model on which 
the procedure is based is beyond the scope of this paper.) 
Next, the e-mails’ elements are stored in the Structured 
Query Language MySql database broken down into spam 
and ham e-mails. The database is intended to be used by 
data-mining tools and (simpler) statistical analyzers. Figure 
3 provides a survey of the implementation infrastructure.
First Empirical Results
In total, 15,178 ham e-mails and 8,189 spam e-mails 
have been recorded by our mail server. Because of the very 
early stage of the project, the results presented here are 
preliminary; however, some facts are worth mentioning:
■ No spam has been sent to addresses that were used 
for subscribing German newsletters/mailing lists.
■ Only a few spam e-mails have been received by way 
of US newsletter/mailing list subscription. The few 
are all due to administration topics.
■ Not surprisingly, many more spam e-mails arise from 
placements on web pages. Interestingly, German 
web pages were responsible for only a third of the 
number of spam e-mails that are due to US web 
pages. Net-addresses seem to be of greater interest to 
spammers than de- and org-addresses independently 
of any country; on US web sites com-addresses have 
been even more used by spammers.
Figure 2: Classification of Internet Locations
Figure 3: Infrastructure of the E-mail Honeypot Environment
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Summary and Outlook
Spammers are known to collect as many valid e-mail 
addresses as possible, but little is known about spammers’ 
capabilities and interest in carefully directed, consumer-
oriented marketing. Gaining insight into spammers’ ways 
of obtaining and misusing e-mail addresses is useful for
■ Assessing the effectiveness of AOTs 
■ As input for the improvement of AOTs
■ For identifying spammers leading to their 
prosecution
■ For assessing the usefulness and necessity of hiding 
e-mail addresses on the Internet
■ For discovering specific marketing and addressing 
activities 
This article sketches a honeypot to penetrate spammers’ 
behavior in harvesting e-mail addresses from Internet ser-
vices, such as newsgroups and the Web, and in discovering 
the extent to which spammers have already shifted from 
simply employing e-mail addresses already in use toward 
acquiring addresses of users likely to be interested in specif-
ic marketing offers. The honeypot’s conceptual framework 
classifies Internet locations as used in the empirical study 
using three dimensions: Internet services, (e.g., the Usenet, 
Web pages, newsletters); service-specific topics such as edu-
cation, infotainment, auctions; and countries. Each location 
gets four addresses (de-, com-, net-, and org-address), which 
permits the researcher to detect if the top-level domain of 
an e-mail address is relevant for spammers. When e-mails 
arrive at the honeypot’s mail server, they are classified into 
spam and ham e-mails (regular e-mails), decomposed by a 
parser, and stored in a database that is intended to be used 
by data-mining tools and (simpler) statistical analyzers. 
Preliminary results of the honeypot study are presented, 
which show that no spam has been sent to addresses that 
were used for subscription to German newsletters and mail-
ing lists, that only a few spam e-mails have been received 
due to US newsletter and mailing-list subscriptions, that 
many more spam e-mails arise from placements on Web 
pages, and that net-as well as com-addresses seem to be of 
particular interest to spammers.
The project is at an early stage. More services and coun-
tries remain to be integrated, more data must be collected 
for more reliable results, and a time-series analysis must be 
applied. Another avenue that needs to be explored is the 
functional; i.e., the application of data-mining procedures 
and statistical procedures aiming at detecting differences 
between spam and ham e-mails. These results can be used 
to improve spam filters.
The experiences gained from the prototypic honeypot 
implementation can be used to develop a general blueprint 
for further honeypots that explore spammers’ behaviour 
and the effectiveness of AOTs. Depending on funding, 
software tools will be included to enable a semi-automated 
setup and utilization of future honeypots. n
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